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Introduction

ast September’s historic agreement under the Montreal
Protocol to accelerate the phase-out of hydrochlorofluorocarbons (“HCFCs”) marked the first time both developed and developing countries explicitly agreed to accept binding
and enforceable commitments to address climate change.1 This
is particularly significant because the decision was taken by
consensus by the 191 Parties to the Protocol—all but five countries recognized by the United
Nations. 2 Accelerating the
HCFC phase-out could reduce
emissions by sixteen billion
tons of carbon dioxide-equivalent (“CO2e”) through 2040.3 In
terms of radiative forcing, this
will delay climate change by up
to 1.5 years.4 This is because, in
addition to depleting the ozone
layer, HCFCs also are potent
greenhouse gases (“GHGs”)—
with some thousands of times more powerful than carbon dioxide (“CO2”) at warming the planet. Thus, from September 2007
both Montreal and Kyoto can be considered climate protection
treaties.
The HCFC agreement and its climate benefits were possible
largely because of the Montreal Protocol’s unique history of
continuous adjustment to keep pace with scientific understanding and technological capability.5 The Parties to the Protocol
generally regard the treaty as fair, due to its objective technical assessment bodies and its effective financial mechanism,
the Multilateral Fund. These features and others have made the
Protocol the world’s most successful multilateral environmental
agreement, phasing out ninety-five percent of global production
of ozone-depleting substances in just twenty years and placing
the ozone layer on a path to recovery.6
The Montreal Protocol offers additional opportunities to
reduce GHG emissions further, including by creating greater
incentives for the recovery and destruction of ozone-depleting
substances currently in chemical inventory or contained in
refrigerators, air conditioners, and other products and equipment
still in service or not yet disposed.7 As with the HCFC agreement, these opportunities can achieve immediate and substantial reductions in GHG emissions, as well as further speed the
recovery of the ozone layer. More significantly, they can be pur-

sued immediately and independently of the international climate
treaty negotiations.

The Montreal Protocol:
“Start and Strengthen”
In 1987, the Parties to the Montreal Protocol required a
freeze in halon production and a fifty percent reduction in the
production of chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”), and have continually strengthened the treaty since then as it became clear that
ozone protection required that
other ozone-depleting substances
must be controlled and as new
environmentally-superior substitutes and alternatives were developed. This is one of the great
strengths of the Protocol, and it
did not arise by accident. To the
contrary, the treaty is designed
to be flexible, allowing the Parties to strengthen and fine-tune
its provisions to stay abreast of
current scientific understanding and technological capability.8
As Mostafa Tolba, the fomer UNEP Executive Director and
“father” of the Montreal Protocol, has said of the treaty’s evolution: “Start and strengthen.” 9
Adding or removing substances from the treaty’s control
measures generally requires an “amendment,” which then must
be ratified by each Party’s government.10 Amendments can be
time-consuming, often taking years, or even decades, before
every Party completes ratification. For example, the most recent
“Beijing Amendment” agreed on in 1999 did not enter into force
until January 2001 and today is ratified only by 135 of the 191
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Parties to the Montreal Protocol. The treaty has been amended
four times.11
But the Parties can change or, more specifically, accelerate
the Protocol’s phase-out schedules by “adjustment ,” a procedure
used six times. Adjustments do not require ratification and take
effect within six months of agreement, except for parties that
affirmatively opt out. In the United States, for example, Congress included “adjustments adopted by the Parties thereto and
amendments that have entered
into force” in its definition of the
Montreal Protocol when it incorporated its provisions into the
1990 Amendments to the Clean
Air Act.12
The adjustment procedure
was instrumental in the evolution
of the Protocol. The original text
of the 1987 Protocol included
only CFCs and halon ozone-depleting substances and required
developed countries to phase out fifty percent of CFC production
by 2000 and to freeze halon production. This was woefully inadequate in terms of protecting the ozone layer, but nevertheless a
political and diplomatic triumph given concerns at the time that
the science was not yet certain, the substitutes did not yet exist,
and the projected costs looked prohibitive.
Shortly after the Protocol entered into force, the science
of stratospheric ozone depletion and the Antarctic Ozone Hole
were confirmed with empirical evidence—showing that the
situation was potentially more grave than originally perceived.
The modest control measures imposed in 1987 created a market
for substitutes and alternatives, which were quickly developed
and deployed. And many businesses complied at no cost or, in
some cases, at a profit. As a result, the fifty percent phase-out of
CFCs by 2000 was subsequently adjusted in 1990 to require a
seventy-five percent phase-out by 1998 (and one-hundred percent by 2000), and then adjusted again in 1992 to require a onehundred percent phase-out by 1996—all within the treaty’s first
five years. Through amendment and adjustment, the Montreal
Protocol now regulates ninety-six different chemicals used in
more than 240 sectors and thousands of applications.

Estimates reported by the Montreal Protocol’s Technology
and Economic Assessment Panel (“TEAP”) showed that HCFC
use could exceed 700,000 tonnes by 2015—roughly five times
more than the TEAP’s 1998 projection of just 163,000 tonnes.13
The Protocol’s Scientific Assessment Panel reported in 2006
that the recovery of the ozone layer to pre-1980 levels would
likely be delayed by fifteen years over Antarctica, to 2065, and
by five years at mid-latitudes, to 2049, with the delay at midlatitudes partly due to the high
estimates of future production of HCFCs.14 In addition,
the Environmental Investigation Agency reported in 2006
that HCFC emissions by 2015
could cancel out the reductions
achieved by the Kyoto Protocol during its first commitment
period of 2008–2012.15
The increased HCFC use was driven partly by economic
growth in developing countries and by a “perverse incentive”
under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism
(“CDM”).16 The most commonly used HCFC is HCFC-22,
which produces by-product emissions of HFC-23 when it is
manufactured. Under the CDM, eligible HCFC-22 producers in
developing countries could generate Certified Emissions Reductions (“CERs”) by capturing and destroying HFC-23 by-product
emissions.17 HFC-23 is a super-GHG with a global warming
potential (“GWP”) of 11,700.18 HFC-23 CERs could earn up
to ten times the cost of capturing and destroying HFC-23 emissions and are exceeding the sales revenue of HCFC-22,19 effectively subsidizing the cost of producing HCFC-22 and driving
its expanded use, including in applications where it has not been
widely used or had already been replaced.20
The original HCFC control measures were not negotiated
with these higher than expected levels in mind. Originally,
the Montreal Protocol required developing countries to freeze
HCFC consumption by 2016 at 2015 levels and phase-out one
hundred percent of HCFC production by 2040. It required developed countries to phase out 99.5 percent of HCFCs by 2020,
with 0.5 percent allowed for servicing existing equipment until
2030.21 By early 2007, there was concern that without urgent
action, developing countries would have difficulty in complying
with the 2016 freeze and the 2040 phase-out.22

The adjustment procedure
was instrumental in the
evolution of the Protocol.

Rapid Increase in HCFC Use Threatens
Climate as well as Ozone
At their nineteenth meeting on September 22, 2007, the
Parties agreed to adjust the Montreal Protocol to accelerate the
phase-out of HCFCs. Fittingly, the meeting celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the Montreal Protocol.
HCFCs are ozone-depleting substances regulated under
the Montreal Protocol as “transitional” substitutes for the more
damaging CFCs. Like CFCs, they were used in a variety of
applications, including refrigerators and air conditioners, as
foam blowing agents, and as chemical solvents. By 2006, it was
clear that the use of HCFCs in developing countries was growing rapidly and threatening the recovery of the ozone layer and
potentially undermining efforts to mitigate climate change.
47

Montreal Protocol’s Success Made It
the World’s Best Climate Treaty
As it approached its twentieth anniversary, the Montreal
Protocol already was widely considered the world’s most successful multilateral environmental agreement. But what many
did not know is that its success in phasing out ozone-depleting
substances also made it the world’s best climate treaty—so far.
The publication of a groundbreaking paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (“PNAS”) calculated
the climate benefits of the Montreal Protocol, and the results
helped spur the international community to action.23 Because
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

CFCs are such potent GHGs, the Montreal Protocol is reducing
emissions by 135 GtCO2e between 1990 and 2010 and delaying
climate forcing by seven to twelve years.24 When pre-Montreal
Protocol efforts to protect the ozone layer are included, such as
voluntary reductions in CFCs and domestic regulations in the
1970s, the delay in climate forcing is thirty-five to forty-one
years.25
The PNAS article drew greater attention to both the ozone
and the climate impacts of the increased HCFC use. It became
the foundation for key Parties and non-governmental organizations to make the case for strengthening the Montreal Protocol
by accelerating the HCFC phase-out to maximize its climate
benefits—as well as to ensure the continued success of the treaty
in protecting the ozone layer. In particular, the article received
considerable attention at meetings of the Stockholm Group, an
informal gathering of ozone and climate experts that played a
critical role in reviewing the technical and economic data supporting an accelerated HCFC phase-out and building consensus
among developed and developing country governments.

Proposals to Accelerate HCFC Phase-Out
Cited Climate Benefits
In March 2007, an “unusual coalition” of nine Parties submitted six separate proposals (some jointly) to accelerate the
phase-out of HCFCs.26 Proposals came from both developed
and developing countries, and nearly all cited the potential climate benefits of an accelerated HCFC phase-out, as well as the
ozone benefits. Small island and coastal developing countries,
including Argentina, Brazil, Mauritius, and the Federated States
of Micronesia, were among the Parties stressing the need to
take immediate action to mitigate the causes of climate change
as part of their justification for an accelerated HCFC phase-out.
The United States also referenced climate considerations in its
proposal, which put forward one of the most aggressive accelerated phase-out schedules.
The Parties met at the 27th Open-Ended Working Group in
June 2007, to discuss the proposals and recognized a “clear need
to accelerate the timetable for the phase-out of ozone-depleting
substances, in particular HCFCs.”27 On June 7, the G8 Summit
Declaration added further support, committing to “accelerating
the phase-out of HCFCs in a way that supports energy efficiency
and climate change objectives.”28
As the twentieth anniversary Meeting of the Parties
approached, key Parties and influential scientists and policymakers began to weigh in on the HCFC issue. Dr. Mario Molina,
who in 1995 shared the Nobel Prize with Dr. Sherwood Rowland for their work in the 1970s on the impacts CFCs had on the
ozone layer, wrote an influential opinion piece for the Financial
Times of London, stating,
Now it is time for the ozone treaty to make its role in
reducing climate emissions more explicit. This should
start next month with an agreement among the parties to accelerate the phase-out of hydrofluorocarbons
in a way that promotes energy efficiency and climate
change objectives. . . . In the light of the short time
Winter 2008

before we reach the planet’s ‘tipping point,’ they cannot afford to fail.29
As the negotiations progressed, the key questions, particularly for developing countries, were the availability of substitutes
and whether assistance through the treaty’s financial mechanism,
the Multilateral Fund, would be available.
With regard to substitutes, the evidence clearly showed that
they were commercially available for virtually all HCFC applications. The UNEP 2007 Synthesis Report concluded that technically and economically feasible substitutes were available for
almost all HCFC applications.30
Financing the accelerated phase-out was more complicated.
Under the 1990 Amendments to the Montreal Protocol, developed country Parties must provide financial assistance, through
the Multilateral Fund, to developing country Parties to cover the
agreed incremental costs of making the transition out of ozonedepleting substances and into more environmentally friendly
substitutes and alternatives. Thus far, the Fund has disbursed
approximately $2.3 billion in financial assistance. The high levels of HCFC use, particularly in China, meant that the amount
of financial assistance would need to increase substantially to
cover incremental costs for HCFCs at a time when many donor
Parties were expecting financing for the Montreal Protocol to be
winding down. Indeed, many thought the ozone layer problem
had already been solved and the time had come to discontinue
the Montreal Protocol itself.

HCFC Agreement Provides for
Climate-Friendly Substitutes and Financing
After a week of intense negotiations in Montreal, the Parties reached an agreement to accelerate the HCFC phase-out.31
For developing countries, the new control measures shift the
base year from 2015 to an average of 2009 and 2010 and the
freeze date from 2016 to 2013. Developing countries must then
phase-out ten percent of production by 2015, thirty-five percent
by 2020, 67.5 percent by 2025, and 97.5 percent by 2030, with
2.5 percent allowed for servicing existing equipment until 2040.
Developed countries, many of which have already completed a
transition out of HCFCs, must now phase-out seventy-five percent of production by 2010, instead of sixty-five percent, with
a 99.5 percent phase-out by 2020, and 0.5 percent allowed for
servicing existing equipment until 2030.
Accelerating the HCFC phase-out will reduce emissions an
estimated sixteen GtCO2e or more through 2040, with the actual
climate benefits depending on the success replacing HCFCs with
zero and low GWP substitutes, and/or preventing future emissions of these substitutes by providing for a robust system to
recover and recycle or destroy used chemicals at equipment endof-life.32
In an effort to maximize these potential climate benefits, the
adjustment decision calls on the Parties to “promote the selection of alternatives to HCFCs that minimize environmental
impacts, in particular impacts on climate” and to give priority to
“substitutes and alternatives that minimize other impacts on the
environment, including on the climate, taking into account glob48

al-warming potential, energy use, and other relevant factors.”33
By explicitly referencing the climate impacts of HCFC substitutes and alternatives, the adjustment marks the first time that
both developed and developing countries have agreed to accept
binding commitments to mitigate climate change.
The adjustment decision also includes provisions to ensure
that developing countries receive financial assistance through the
Multilateral Fund to make the transition out of HCFCs, although
the details of implementation will continue to be negotiated at
the Fund’s Executive Committee
meetings.
The agreement was hailed
worldwide. Achim Steiner, the
Executive Director of the United
Nations Environment Programme,
called it “the most important
breakthrough in an environmental negotiation process for at
least five or six years because it
sets a very specific target with an
ambitious timetable.”34 Romina
Picolotti, Argentina’s Minister
of Environment and an early and
vocal proponent of the accelerated HCFC phase-out, described it
as “important for the ozone layer, and even more important for
the climate. It shows us what we can do when we have the spirit
to cooperate.”35

tion of an amount of one chemical, for example, CFCs, would
allow the production or consumption of an equal amount, on an
ODP-weighted basis, of an ODS from another chemical group,
for example, HCFCs.40 It could include programs to encourage
greater recovery and recycling or destruction, such as Refrigerant Reclaim Australia.41 In addition, the Chicago Climate
Exchange issued the first carbon offset methodology in late 2007
that would allow the destruction of ODS banks to generate offset
credits.42
One additional benefit of
a robust recovery and recycle/
destruction program is that it
undercuts the traditional paradigm where consumption of
ODS or ODS substitutes is
treated as equal to emissions.
With guaranteed recovery and
destruction, it would be possible to allow the continued
use of certain chemicals whose
direct impacts on the ozone and
the climate may be high, but
whose indirect benefits, such as
improved energy efficiency, make them desirable to available
alternatives.43
There is growing support for new measures creating greater
incentives for the recovery and destruction of banks. At the September 2007 Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol,
the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Stephen Johnson, challenged, “all delegations to consider ways
of destroying the banks of ozone-depleting substances currently installed in equipment. These large sources of CFCs and
other ozone-depleting substances represent a ripe opportunity
to both further protect the ozone layer and to reduce emissions
that contribute to global climate change.”44 At the December
2007 Climate Conference in Bali, the United States, Argentina,
Micronesia, and Mauritius answered this challenge at a side
event organized by the Institute for Governance & Sustainable
Development, where they stated their interest in strengthening
the Montreal Protocol to address the threat from banks.

In March 2007, an
“unusual coalition” of
nine Parties submitted
proposals to accelerate the
phase-out of HCFCs.

Next Up at the Montreal Protocol:
Creating Greater Incentives
for the Recovery and Destruction of Banks
There are several other measures that the Parties can take
that will mitigate climate change, including the “practical measures” developed as part of the Ozone Secretariat’s Workshop on
the IPCC/TEAP Special Report held in July 2006.36 The TEAP
calculates that an accelerated HCFC phase-out plus the “practical measures” identified at the Workshop can result in cumulative emissions reductions of about 1.25 million ozone depleting
potential (“ODP”) tonnes and thirty GtCO2e.37
In particular, banks of CFCs and other ozone-depleting substances (“ODSs”) represent a significant threat to the ozone layer
and the climate. Banks are defined as ODSs contained in existing equipment (e.g. air conditioners and refrigerators), products
(e.g. foam insulation), and stockpiles (e.g. the military stockpiles various chemicals for specialized uses). These exist in both
developed and developing Parties. Approximately 7.4 GtCO2e
of CFCs, currently contained in banks of existing equipment and
products, is expected to be released into the atmosphere between
2002 and 2015.38 There will be additional significant emissions
beyond 2015 as more CFC and HCFC-based equipment reaches
end-of-life.39
Emissions of CFCs and other ODSs from banks could be
avoided by creating greater incentives for their recovery and
destruction. This should include allowing destruction credits to
carry forward for more than one year, to be traded between Parties, and to transfer among chemical groups, where the destruc49

Other Measures
Other strategies for strengthening the Montreal Protocol
were described in the original SDLP article,45 including exempting HCFC-123 from phase-out and allowing its continued use
until superior substitutes are developed, based on its negligible
ozone impacts and the energy efficiency advantage of HCFC-123
chillers over the primary alternative, HFC-134a, where HCFC123 results in lower GHG emissions associated with power generation to run the chillers, as well as lower operating costs over
the thirty-year life of the equipment.
The Montreal Protocol also should strengthen its compliance efforts by building on work already underway in the Secretariat, UNEP OzonAction’s compliance assistance program, and
elsewhere, to promote an ambitious capacity building program.
This can be accomplished by linking with the Green Customs
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Initiative of UNEP, and the International Network for Environmental Compliance & Enforcement. A much more aggressive
effort is warranted by the combined ozone and climate benefits
from strict compliance.
With regard to the use of ODSs for feedstocks, process
agents, and quarantine and preshipment (“QPS”) applications,
requiring mandatory periodic review of current uses and their
direct and indirect impacts on the ozone and climate, utilizing a
Life Cycle Analysis, would lay the groundwork for future action
banning the use of ODSs where alternatives that are less harmful
to the environment are available. Half of the HCFC-22 produced
today is used as feedstocks and process agents exempt from the
Montreal Protocol accelerated phaseout; and thus half of the
global emissions of HFC-23, a super GHG, is a consequence
of allowing exempted HCFC uses. Unfortunately, the Montreal
Protocol and its TEAP have not yet investigated the technical
feasibility of reducing and eliminating these uses—including the
options of not-in-kind technology for the products that currently
depend on HCFCs in production.
Finally, the Montreal Protocol also should require use of the
concept of Life Cycle Climate Performance (“LCCP”), which is
considered a practical elaboration of Life-Cycle Analysis. LCCP
was proposed by the TEAP to calculate the “cradle-to-grave” climate impacts of the use of ODSs in equipment. Direct emissions
result from the leaks of chemicals into the atmosphere. Indirect
emissions result from the energy consumption due to manufacturing, operation, and disposal at the end of product life and
also account for the carbon content of the fuel utilized in each
process and product life. The Mobile Air Conditioning Climate
Protection Partnership has posted its LCCP model on the U.S.
EPA website showing the combined climate life cycle impact

of refrigerant greenhouse gases directly emitted and the indirect
greenhouse gas emissions of fuel used to produce, power, transport, and dispose the equipment.46

Conclusion
The Montreal Protocol and its success in protecting both
the ozone layer and the climate show that global environmental problems can be solved through international cooperation.
As the world works toward a post-2012 climate treaty, the
twenty-year history of the Montreal Protocol offers invaluable
lessons for climate negotiators and demonstrates the potential
of international environmental law in the pursuit of sustainable
development.47
Climate mitigation under the Montreal Protocol is one of
several key strategies for achieving immediate climate mitigation, along with strategies for energy efficiency, reductions in
black carbon, or soot, expansion of renewables, and enhancement and protection of forests and other sinks. These and other
immediate mitigation strategies are needed to buy critical time
to develop a sufficiently strong post-2012 climate regime.
It is impossible to say just how much the planet will warm
before triggering abrupt climate changes, but critical thresholds could be as near as ten years away, and it is imperative
to strengthen the Montreal Protocol to avoid every ton of CO2e
emissions that it can. In addition to finishing the job of protecting the ozone layer, this is one of the best insurance policies the
world can buy to give us time to succeed with our long-term
climate controls. And it is an insurance policy that we can be
confident will be delivered by the world’s best environmental
treaty.
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